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Abstract 
Building on the existing understanding of the dynamics of 
mass protest, this paper argues that social media data can 
be used to detect the occurrence of such protests. It out-
lines a theoretical framework arguing that during times of 
mass mobilization, network central actors will geograph-
ically converge upon city centers, and that the relative 
magnitudes of social media activity in the center and pe-
riphery of the state can be used to detect the occurrence of 
protests. This article presents a new dataset of 2.2 million 
geocoded Ukrainian tweets, which are used to empirically 
test the theory against the observed 2014 Euromaidan 
protests in Ukraine. By relying completely on count and 
network data rather than keywords, hashtags, or other 
contextual clues from the content, this technique is porta-
ble across language barriers and national borders. 
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F 
rom February 18 to 20 of 2014, Ukrainian citi-
zens entered the streets of Kiev in numbers not 
seen since the Orange Revolution of 2005. The 
result was eerily similar: Viktor Yanukovich 
driven from the capital and a pro-western regime installed 
in his place. The revolution reflected the ubiquity of new 
communication technologies: streamed live in video, pic-
ture, and text over social media. As became evident during 
the Arab Spring, the Internet's spread of universal, instan-
taneous, and mobile mass communication is transforming 
the way that protest and mass social action occurs 
(Anderson, 2011; Farrell, 2012; Sabadello, 2012; Stepano-
va, 2011; Tucker, Barberá, & Metzger, 2013; Zhuo, Well-
man, & Yu, 2011). 
 While such work has probed the use of new commu-
nication technologies for the organization of mass protest 
in the context of theories of collective action and social 
movements, little work has focused on effects in the oppo-
site causal direction. That is, while we have analyzed the 
effects of social media on the development of mass protest, 
we have little understanding of how mass events in the 
real world affect activity on social networks. Thus this pro-
ject's exploratory research question can be formulated: 
how does mass protest geospatially affect social media ac-
tivity? 
This exploration has the additional benefit of 
providing a new tool for the measurement of mass protest. 
Our capacity for measuring the occurrence of protest still 
remains grounded in manual efforts by those on the 
ground, such as reporters or nongovernment organizations 
(NGO) observers estimating how many people are in a par-
ticular capital square on a particular day. This leaves 
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enormous gaps in our measurement of protest because it 
relies on experts being in place on the ground as events 
are occurring, and upon the ability of free media to publish 
such reports. Data from Ukraine during the several 
months of waxing and waning protests in 2013 and 2014 
are especially telling in this regard. News reports tended 
to report days of truly massive turnout (usually on Sun-
days) but had disjointed and inconsistent reports of turn-
out on other days. In addition, virtually all coverage was of 
Kiev, with only occasional reports indicating that protests 
were occurring in regional capitals as well during much of 
this period. 
This article explores how social media geospatially 
reacts to the occurrence of mass protest, using a new, mas-
sive dataset of geocoded Twitter data originating in 
Ukraine before, during, and after the events of Euro-
maidan. It finds strong evidence of mass protest in a state 
being associated with an increase in social media activity 
nationwide, an absolute drop in social media activity at 
the physical location of the protest, but an increase in the 
network-weighted social media activity at the protest's lo-
cation. 
 
The Internet, Social Media, and Mass Protest 
 There are two basic schools of thought regarding 
the effect of the Internet’s development upon politics. The 
first argues that the various technologies afforded by the 
Internet are at best irrelevant to politics in the grand 
scheme of things, and at worst have various negative ef-
fects such as homophily, diminished institution-building, 
and empowerment of authoritarian regimes (Faris, & 
Etling, 2008; Gentzkow, & Shapiro, 2011; Morozov, 2012; 
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Page, 2008; Sunstein, 2009; Wilson, 2016a; Wojcieszak & 
Mutz, 2009). The second school of thought argues that the 
Internet deeply changes political equilibria by virtue of 
greatly reducing the transaction costs that make collective 
action difficult to organize (Castells, 2009; Diamond, 2010; 
Shirky, 2009; Wilson, 2016a). 
 Social media are of particular interest to this de-
bate given its widespread adoption over the last decade, 
and specific capacity for allowing individuals to communi-
cate en masse. The vast bulk of the social science litera-
ture on the effect of social media on political mobilization 
thus far has focused on its influence upon the events of the 
Arab Spring (Alqudsi-ghabra, Al-bannai, & Al-bahrani, 
2011; Hofheinz, 2005; Mackell, 2011; Murphy, 2006; Oghia 
& Indelicato, 2011; Sabadello, 2012; Stepanova, 2011; 
Zhuo et al., 2011) and Color Revolutions (Bunce & Wol-
chik, 2010; Chowdhury, 2008; Dyczok, 2005; Goldstein, 
2007; Kyj, 2006). 
 There is also disagreement over the role that social 
media plays with regard to the development of mass pro-
test in particular. Some scholars argue that social media 
are used to better solve the classic collective action prob-
lem by lowering the transaction costs of organization 
(Shirky, 2009). In addition, this literature argues that so-
cial media benefit from the easy proliferation of weak ties 
among a population. Weak ties (as opposed to the strong 
ties formed by ethnic or class identities) are understood to 
play an important role in mass mobilization. Others argue 
that the usage of social media is ex post facto information-
al, rather than organizational. That is, discussion of mass 
events on social media happens after the fact, as descrip-
tive discussion of events rather than as a tool for organiz-
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ing those events in the first place. The distinction between 
these two theories is one that should be relatively simple 
to empirically test, at least in principle. If social media are 
organizational, events should be discussed before they 
happen, which should not be the case if usage is merely 
descriptive. In practice, however, this distinction has been 
challenging to reliably test. For instance, in the case of the 
2011 London riots, the richness of available data has led to 
various scholars tackling the use of Twitter by various 
populations, including police, government, rioters, and 
journalists. However, that extensive literature has been 
unable to reach any consensus as to the causal role of so-
cial media in events that occurred (Baker, 2012; Denef, 
Bayerl, & Kaptein, 2013; Glasgow, & Fink, 2013; Panag-
iotopoulos, Bigdeli, & Sams, 2014; Procter, Vis, & Voss, 
2013; Tonkin, Pfeiffer, & Tourte, 2012; Vis, 2013). 
 In addition, the problem of measuring incidents of 
mass protest is a long-standing one in the social sciences. 
The challenge is typically met by hand-coding of newspa-
per accounts from local areas, or by ethnographies gather-
ing accounts of individuals present at events, after the 
fact. However, automated event identification algorithms 
have gained traction over the last decade, as increasingly 
sophisticated pattern detection software and the wide 
availability of electronic news media have proliferated. 
These projects, such as the EMBERS project 
(Ramakrishnan et al., 2014), the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (Sundberg & Melander, 2013), and ICEWS 
(Boschee et al., 2015), share a basic conceptual basis de-
spite different technical implementations. Computer soft-
ware examines news reports for keywords (such as 
“protest” or “violence”) and uses contextualization tech-
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niques to identify events along with their location, date, 
time, and metadata of interest to the project such as num-
ber of participants, number of arrests or deaths, demo-
graphic group of individuals involved, or issues being pro-
tested. 
 This approach has several limitations. First, these 
projects are entirely dependent on the availability of time-
ly electronic copies of free media in the geographic loca-
tions of interest. This is problematic in the cases of author-
itarian states that control the media narrative or areas 
that have very limited media coverage due to poverty, lack 
of political power, or other factors. Second, they are lan-
guage dependent, requiring keywords and the context al-
gorithms to be adapted for every required language. This 
process does not entail simple dictionary translations, but 
requires understanding how such information is contextu-
ally conveyed in different ways in different languages. 
 Some of these issues have been taken up by apply-
ing event identification algorithms to social media as well. 
These tools use keyword searches of various levels of so-
phistication to detect whether or not people are talking 
about protest (or other events of substantive interest) in a 
particular geographic area (van Zoonen & van de Meer, 
2016; Becker, Naaman, & Gravano, 2010; Chae et al., 
2012; Pohl, Bouchachia, & Hellwagner, 2012). 
 This article explores an understudied element of 
the intersection between social media and mass protest by 
using geocoded tweets in order to understand how social 
media geographically reacts to the occurrence of mass pro-
test within a country. It does so by taking a systems ap-
proach that is not dependent on either the availability of 
traditional media or the content of tweets. 
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Data: Euromaidan and Geocoded Twitter 
 Exploring the effect of mass protest on social media 
in the proposed way requires two sets of data: geocoded 
social media data and event data on mass protests. Given 
their significant size, discrete start and end point, relative-
ly long period of contiguous time, and satisfactory coverage 
in both the news media and social media, the Euromaidan 
protests make for an acceptable case study for the project. 
As such, this study's data collection is bounded from Octo-
ber 1, 2013 to March 31, 2014. This six-month block of 
time includes a month and a half before and after the pro-
tests began and ended, respectively. 
 The social media dataset was constructed from a 
custom database infrastructure built to collect tweets en 
masse, which has been downloading all geocoded tweets 
(i.e., those that have a GPS-generated latitude and longi-
tude attached to the tweet) originating from the former 
Soviet world in real-time since the beginning of 2012 
(Wilson, 2016b). This particular project uses the subset of 
this database corresponding to tweets posted from within 
Ukraine during the six months of the study, amounting to 
approximately 2.2 million individual tweets. 
 This data is all geocoded, with the exact latitude 
and longitude of the originating device recorded at the mo-
ment of the tweet. These coordinates are accurate to with-
in two meters, so they can be used for precise subnational 
analysis impossible with most social science data sources. 
Custom written GIS code identified the Ukrainian raion 
(roughly equivalent to county-level, with 490 total in 
Ukraine) from which each tweet originated. Additional 
code was written to aggregate the tweets such that the 
unit of analysis was raion-days, yielding an n of 181 days. 
thejsms.org 
Page 12 
 In addition, the data includes the number of friends 
that the user who tweeted had at the moment of the tweet, 
which allows quantification of how important to the over-
all network the particular user is. On social media, users 
with more friends or followers can be understood to have a 
higher number of weak ties, that is, they are more net-
work-central actors. As such, this paper defines the net-
work-weighted number of tweets as the multiplication of 
the number of tweets by the poster's number of friends at 
the time of the tweet, effectively weighting every tweet by 
the number of network connections possessed by the 
tweeter. For instance, if Anna had three friends and tweet-
ed once, while Bob had one friend and tweeted twice, 
Anna's network-weighted measure would be three, while 
Bob's would be two. 
 In order to capture geographic variation made pos-
sible by the tweets’ geocoding, these tweets are divided in-
to two groups: those originating from within the urban 
raions of Pecherskyi and Shevchenkivskyi (the two small 
raions in central Kiev that feature the capitol, government 
buildings, and Maidan Square), and those originating from 
the rest of Ukraine. There two groups of tweets are re-
ferred to as core and periphery for ease of reference. 
  Finally, operationalization of the occurrence of 
mass protest was accomplished by hand-coding events us-
ing mainstream international media sources such as the 
BBC and Associated Press, in conjunction with event data 
from ICEWS (Boschee et al., 2015). First, a dichotomous 
variable was coded on a daily basis over the period of the 
study, with a one indicating a mass protest occurred in 
central Kiev, while a zero indicated there was no protest. 
It was well-documented that protest of some minimal level 
 Page 13                    The Journal of Social Media in Society 6(2) 
was constant during the period of November 21 to Febru-
ary 28, and so those days were coded as one, whiles days 
outside that range were coded as a zero. Media on these 
days would often use qualitative descriptions such as "a 
large number of protesters,” while they tended to provide 
estimates of exact numbers of participants only for the 
larger Sunday protests. 
 In addition, for the three-day peak of protest in 
which the largest crowds were present, violence erupted, 
and the government fled the country, hand-coding from 
media accounts (both Ukrainian and international) estab-
lished where and when specific violent incidents occurred 
within central Kiev. These incidents were assigned a 
timestamp, in addition to as precise a latitude and longi-
tude as possible given the descriptions of news accounts, 
generally corresponding to either a specific landmark or a 
street intersection, for instance: "In a renewed assault 
shortly after 04:00 local time on Wednesday (02:00 GMT), 
the police tried to move on the protesters' tents near the 
main monument on the square" (BBC, 2014). 
 These data provide a rich set of measures in order 
to explore how social media are impacted by events of 
mass protest. They allow the distinction between central 
and peripheral social media activity geographically, and 
along the dimensions of both absolute and network-weight 
quantities of tweets. Finally, the mapping of incidents of 
violence at the peak of protest and the dichotomous coding 
of whether mass protest occurred in central Kiev on a dai-
ly basis provide two different elements of events in the re-
al world that can be analyzed as to their relationship with 
social media activity. 
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Empirics 
 Given the dichotomous variable of whether mass 
protest occurred, and interest in its relationship with sev-
eral social media variables, a logistic regression frame-
work is ideal, especially since the dichotomous variable is 
one in approximately half of the cases. Regressions were 
run in R, using the glm package (R Core Team, 2017). 
Code and data files are available upon request. This treats 
the occurrence of mass protest as the dependent variable 
and the social media variables as independent variables, 
with the units of analysis being days, with an n of 181. 
Note that as this is an exploratory analysis, the regression 
design should not imply that the social media variables 
are causing the occurrence of mass protest, but is simply 
measuring the correlative relationship between the two 
sides of the equation. 
 Additionally, "time" has been also been used as an 
independent variable, operationalized simply as the num-
ber of days since the start of the sample (i.e. October 1 is 
"1" and  March 31 is "181"). This is to control for the fact 
that social media activity, all else being equal, is rising 
over time (from February 2012 to April 2014, the number 
of tweets originating from Ukraine over time increased in 
a highly linear manner, with an adjusted R2 on a univari-
ate Ordinary Least Squares, OLS, of 0.85). 
 Table 1 reports the results of the logistic regres-
sion, with highly statistically significant effects for each of 
the independent variables, in both intuitive and counter-
intuitive directions. 
 First, note the sign for the absolute quantity of 
tweets in the periphery. It is positive, which is intuitive: 
when a mass protest is occurring, the country's eyes are on 
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it. Since individuals tend to communicate more during his-
toric events, it would be expected for communication usage 
of all kinds to surge, which would include increased post-
ing to social media sites. 
 On the other hand, the absolute quantity of tweets 
in central Kiev, where the mass protests were predomi-
nantly occurring, is actually negatively associated with the 
occurrence of mass protest. This is highly counter-intuitive 
in one sense: if there are hundreds of thousands of people 
packed into the city center, one would expect social media 
usage in the city center to greatly increase. One explana-
tion would be that those on the ground at the site of pro-
test will not post as much on social media in real time, be-
cause they are engaged in other activities. While there are 
certainly posts to social media being transmitted from the 
midst of mass protest (recall the famous images and videos 
of regime violence during the peak of the Arab Spring), all 
else being equal, active protesters will tweet less than if 
they are not protesting. This may be evidence that the use 
Table 1 
Logistic Regression of Occurrence of Protest on Social Media 
Variables  (n=181) 
  Coefficient P 
Periphery tweets 1.880x10-3 <0.001*** 
Core tweets -5.453x10-2 <0.001*** 
Periphery network-
weighted tweets 
-3.979x10-6 <0.001*** 
Core network-weighted 
tweets 
1.123x10-4 <0.001*** 
Time -2.981x10-2 0.004** 
Intercept -10.32 <0.001*** 
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of social media in conjunction with protest may indeed be 
organizational rather than descriptive. 
 An examination of the geography of tweets and vio-
lence provides some support for this interpretation. Figure 
1 is a map of central Kiev, with the small dots indicating 
an individual tweet posted during the period of February 
18-20 (the height of the protests), while the large stars in-
dicate individual instances of violence (hand-coded from 
newspaper sources, as described in the last section). The 
bulk of the violence took place on the east side of the map, 
near the main government buildings. Each of those loca-
tions represents multiple instances of violence due to the 
imprecision of newspaper accounts. By and large, where 
violence occurred, tweets did not, while most of the twitter 
activity occurred to the northwest in Maidan Square itself, 
where speaking platforms and tents were erected. In one 
sense, this is a microcosm of the organizational versus de-
scriptive debate. Organizational tweets occurred in the 
northwest, and descriptive tweets (of which there were 
proportionately much fewer) originated in the east. 
 Finally, the network-weighted social media activity 
has a positive sign in the center and a negative sign in the 
periphery. This relationship follows from the literature on 
social movements and protests, in which the best predictor 
of attendance of a protest is not ideology or other substan-
tive factors but whether an individual already knows 
someone else going to the protest (Schussman & Soule, 
2005; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). The so-called "power of 
weak ties" suggests that social media's organizational im-
pact on protest may not just be one of easing coordination 
of action, but simply one of making the participation of 
weakly tied individuals far more visible to each other. In 
 Page 17                    The Journal of Social Media in Society 6(2) 
operational terms, mass protests should be evinced by the 
geographic convergence of network-centric individuals, i.e. 
those with many friends, upon the site of the protest. This 
would drain network-weighted social media activity out of 
the periphery and into the center during incidents of mass 
protest. 
 Table 2 renders the results of this regression 
framework as a classification table, showing whether pro-
test was predicted by the model, and how that compared 
with observed instances of mass protest. The results are 
quite stark, with the model correctly predicting the out-
come in 91% of cases, with only eight false negatives and 
nine false positives in the 181 days in the sample. Five of 
the eight false negatives occur during a single week in ear-
ly February  (from the third to the eleventh), which was a 
period described in news accounts as calm, with the num-
ber of protesters in the low thousands. 
Five of the nine false positives are either just before 
or just after the defined period of protest (particularly in 
Figure 1.Violence and tweets in Central Kiev Feb. 18-20, 
2014. 
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the first week of March), which may be indicative of pro-
tests slowly taking off at the beginning, and tapering off at 
the end. Of particular interest though is the false positive 
on October 2. Upon further investigation, this was the day 
of a large one-day protest unrelated to the subsequent 
Maidan protests, in which thousands of protesters were 
turned away from the city council building in central Kiev 
by police with tear gas. This demonstrates the model in 
fact picking up on mass protest events outside of the 
roughly coded dependent variable of the project. 
 
Additional Discussion 
 This article explores how the occurrence of mass 
protest is reflected in social media activity, identifying 
both intuitive and counter-intuitive patterns that lay a 
foundation for further work. 
 One avenue of additional research would be pursu-
ing the distinction between the use of social media for or-
ganizational and descriptive purposes. This article noted 
the stark distinction between Twitter activity adjacent to 
violence and at staging areas several blocks away. This 
points to a complex combination of social media being uti-
lized for both of the theorized uses, but in close geographic 
Table 2 
Classification Table of Logistic Regression 
 No Protest 
(Predicted) 
Protest 
(Predicted) 
Sum 
No Protest (Observed) 73 9 82 
Protest (Observed) 8 91 99 
Sum 81 100 181 
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and temporal proximity that studies with less resolution 
cannot distinguish between. A content analysis of the full 
texts of this sort of social media data with a resolution of 
meters and seconds, could yield a rich understanding of 
how social media and mass protest are causally connected 
at a micro-level. 
 The finding that mass protest in the Euromaidan 
context was associated with drops in absolute levels of so-
cial media activity in the center of Kiev but spikes in net-
work-weighted activity can be exploited in a couple of dif-
ferent ways. First, the existence of this phenomenon can 
be tested generally in other countries and protest contexts 
to see if it is a robust pattern, or an idiosyncrasy of the Eu-
romaidan case. Initial work has begun on duplicating the 
study with geocoded Twitter data from the March 2017 
protests in Russia and Belarus. In addition, if this finding 
is robust, it has the potential to aid in identification of 
mass protest events in areas besides country capitals. Pre-
liminary work has applied this finding to the same tweets 
from this paper, except defining the "center" as particular 
regional capitals instead of Kiev. For instance, reports of 
mass protest in Lviv were found to coincide with this same 
pattern of social media usage, although comprehensive 
testing has not yet been possible due to the scarcity of 
event data on protest in Lviv or other Ukrainian regional 
capitals. 
 However, this also points to one potential applica-
tion of this paper's findings. The sparse data available on 
protests outside of capital cities is one major drawback of 
existing event detection algorithms, and so the capacity of 
social media usage patterns to suggest when and where 
mass protests are occurring could supplement such detec-
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tion algorithms. Because this is non-keyword or language 
dependent, it can provide an additional input into such 
algorithms to indicate places where additional attention 
should be paid. This could help detect protest in cases 
where free media is not available, or when protesters are 
using language not accounted for in keywords. For exam-
ple, discussion of opposition in authoritarian regimes often 
utilizes coded speech, avoiding hot button words like 
"protest" but using euphemisms or alternate terms. The 
findings of this paper can be used to detect protest inde-
pendently of predicted terms, either as an end in and of 
itself, or as a way to identify what keywords are actually 
being used by the population in question, in order to refine 
keyword event detection algorithms, or better understand 
the way that protest is organized and discussed by popula-
tions. 
 Building on our existing understanding of the dy-
namics of mass protest, this paper explores how social me-
dia responds to the occurrence of mass protest, using the 
Euromaidan protests in Ukraine as a case study. The arti-
cle finds that social media usage increases nationwide dur-
ing large mass protests in the capital, and that while abso-
lute social media traffic decreases at the site of mass pro-
test, network-weighted activity increases. By relying com-
pletely on count and network data rather than keywords, 
hashtags, or other contextual clues from the content, its 
findings point to techniques that should be portable across 
language barriers and national borders. In addition, the 
findings are applicable to any geocoded social network, 
and thus have potential for use in any country for which 
similar data are available, even in the absence of wide-
spread Twitter usage. This article lays the foundation for 
 Page 21                    The Journal of Social Media in Society 6(2) 
additional work that could apply its findings both to other 
states and to advancing the fields of detection and analysis 
of mass protests. 
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